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JIHADIST ISLAM AND ITS RATIONALE
El islamismo yihadista y sus razones
L’islamisme djihadiste et ses raisons
Cesáreo GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA1
I.- CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAMISM DEFENDS THE JIHAD OR 
“HOLY WAR” AS ONE OF THE PILLARS OF ISLAM. II. NEITHER MUSLIM 
“REFORMISM” OR THE SO-CALLED “NEO-REFORMISM” HAVE MANAGED 
TO ERADICATE THIS CONCEPT. III.- IT IS STILL HERE, AMONGST US, 
TODAY. IV. -WHAT NOW?
ABSTRACT: The jihadist Islamism is not Islam. Not all Islam is jihadist or participates in its con-
ception of the same. Many Muslims do not believe that jihad (non-defensive) against the infidel is 
one of the pillars of Islam. The World must speak with these Muslims and try to reach agreements 
with them that serve everyone, the People of the Book and others.
KEYWORDS: Jihadism, Jihadism and reformism in Islam, Islamic law and the use of force.
RESUMEN: El islamismo yihadista no es el Islam. Ni todo el Islam es yihadista ni participa de su 
concepto del mismo. Muchos musulmanes no creen que el yihad (no defensivo) contra el infiel sea 
uno de los pilares del Islam. El Mundo debe hablar con estos musulmanes e intentar llegar con ellos 
a acuerdos que sirvan a todos, a las Gentes del Libro y a los demás.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Yihadismo, Yihadismo y Reformismo en el Islam, Derecho islámico y uso 
de la fuerza.
RÉSUMÉ: L’islamisme djihadiste n’est pas l’islam. Tout l’islam n’est pas djihadiste ou participe à 
sa conception de même. Beaucoup de musulmans ne croient pas que le djihad (non défensif) contre 
les infidèles est l’un des piliers de l’islam. Le monde doit parler avec ces musulmans et essayer de 
parvenir à des accords avec eux, au service de tous, des gens du livre et des autres.
MOTS CLÉS: Djihadisme, djihadisme et réformisme dans l’islam, loi  islamique et usage de la 
force.
1 Full Professor (Catedrático) of  International Public Law and International Relations, 
University of  Murcia This study has been carried out within of  the I + D Project “Lucha de 
Civilizaciones” (Estado Islámico, retos y consecuencias para Naciones Unidas, la comunidad internacional 
y su Derecho). ¿Una “Alianza de Civilizaciones contra el Estado Islámico? (DER2015-64205-R), 
MINECO / FEDER (UE), IP: Cesáreo Gutiérrez Espada. 
PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES 
 Journal of  International Law and International Relations
Num 6, janvier-décembre 2018 | ISSN 2341-0868
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.02
Citation: GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, C., «Jihadist Islam and its Rationale», Paix et Sécurité Internationales, num. 6, 
2018, pp. 21-46.
Received: 18 April 2018
Accepted: 15 October 2018
Jihadist Islam and ist Rationale 
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 21-46
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.02
22
I. CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAMISM DEFENDS THE JIHAD OR “HOLY WAR” 
AS ONE OF THE PILLARS OF ISLAM
1. To some extent, the precursor of  Islamic fundamentalism, which took 
shape in some Muslim countries starting from the appearance in Egypt, 
in 1928, of  the Muslim Brothers, was, without doubt the Imam, Taqqi al-
Din Ahmad Ibn Abdelhalim Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). His work had an 
enormous influence on contemporary Islamic thinkers, such as the Egyptian, 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), the Pakistani, al-Maududi (1903-1979) and the 
Palestinian, Abdullah Yusuf  Azzam (1941-1989).
Based on some passages in the Quran2, Ibn Taymiyya understood that 
2 The Legal system rests on Islam.  Essentially, on the Quran and the Sunnah: 1) The Quran 
(al-qur ‘an, “reading”, “recitation”) is the Holy Book, which includes the revelations made 
to Mohammed (Mahoma) by God, through the angel Gabriel, over a twenty year period 
in Mecca and Medina (612-632 AD). The Book is divided into 114 surahs, (suras, al-sura) 
or chapters, with more than 6,200 verses or ayahs (al-aya, “signal”, “sign”, “miracle”) in 
order of  decreasing size. (“Glosario de términos islámicos” [Glossary of  Islamic terms], 
Islamic Cultural centre, Valencia, <http://arabespanol.org/islam/glosario.htm>). Muslims 
consider the Quran to be infallible, but, in Islam, there is no single source for a true and 
official interpretation of  it. 2) The Sunnah contains the deeds and sayings of  the prophet 
(hadith [al-hadiz]), being narrations compiled by his contemporaries, textually citing what the 
Prophet said, or implied, without commentary on the various matters. The hadith consists 
of  an isnad (declaration of  authenticity specifying the chain of  reporters from the nearest up 
to Mohammed himself) and the text in the strictest sense (matn).  After selection took place, 
the AL-BUKHARI (d. 869 AD) collection, with around 8,000 hadiths is the most well known 
and influential, and is considered to be the authoritative version. It should be pointed out, at 
any event, that the hadiths are not infallible and caused considerable differences in substance 
and interpretation between the Sunnis and the Shiites (“Introducción histórica”, Riosalido, 
J. [ed., translation and annotation]: Compendio de Derecho Islámico (Risala fî-l-Fiqh). Ibn Abi Zaid 
Al-Qayrawani, Trotta, Madrid, 1993, pp. 24-25; see also abu-sahlieh, Sami A.A.: Il Diritto Is-
lamico (Fondamenti, fonti, istituzione), Carocci Editiore, Rome, 2008, pp. 183 ss., 191-197).
Where unresolved by the Quran or the Sunnah, Muslim law calls upon a third source (ijmâ 
or general consensus of  the community) which requires unanimous consent from the mujta-
hid, legal scholars with great expertise and moral prestige, so that the ruling made as a result 
of  that consensus is valid.  When these three sources do not provide an answer, a mujtahid 
may resolve the problem by resorting to deductive analogy (qiyas) based on the Holy Book, 
or on the sayings of  the Prophet. The legal scholars, due to their wisdom and integrity, have 
ijtihad (the power to create the rule destined to become a legal regulation). Their opinion or 
legal ruling (al-fatwa, fatwa in English) which may be made as a response to a consultation 
by any Muslim, makes Sharia applicable.  The fatwa does not, in principle, have further value 
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jihad was one of  the most significant obligations of  Islam3, and maintained 
that God himself  imposed the obligation on all Muslims to fight all those 
who, being aware of  Mohammed’s call to Islam, did not become converts4. 
Ibn Taymiyya even maintained that a governor who did not apply Sharia (Is-
lamic law, al-shar’ia, “path to follow”, “straight path”)5 rigorously, in all its 
aspects, would lose their right to govern6.
What is the true meaning of  Jihad? How has it evolved, if  at all? What, 
then, is its reality? 
2. Although the term jihad cannot be limited to one of  its meanings - the “holy 
war” - there is no doubt that this is the one that has clearly been imposed.
The specific, precise development of  the doctrine of  jihad as a holy war 
was based on elements going back to the 7th century onwards.  Based on the 
Prophet’s military experience, who fought and often in armed combat, the 
foundation was laid for a doctrine built on four phases, a design which has 
traditionally been followed by Islamic law scholars: non-confrontation; solely 
outside the moral authority issuing it, although it can become compulsory if  it is approved 
by the majority of  the legal schools. 
3 Therefore it became the second most important “pillar”. Islam considers it essential that 
all its members practice the so-called five “pillars” (arkan al-islam): 1) the profession of  faith 
(shahada): “there is no God other than Allah and Mohammed is his prophet”; 2) the ritual 
prayers (as-salat) which must be said five times a day after the relevant ablutions; 3) pay the 
legal charitable donation, or zakat (az-zakat); 4) fasting during the month of  Ramadan (al-
saum) from sunrise to sunset; and 5) the pilgrimage to Mecca (al-hayy), which is an obligation 
on all adult Muslims, who are physically able and have enough money, at least once in their 
lives.  There are Islamic groups, going back several centuries but which have re-emerged 
today, which add an obligation to these called the “sixth pillar” which, for those believing in 
it, as pointed out already, is the second most important, after the profession of  faith: jihad, 
or the “holy war”.
4 al-ChaRif, Maher: “La evolución del concepto de yihad en el pensamiento islámico”, pp. 
11-12, (conference given in 2008, originally written in Arabic and translated by Magda Makki, 
<http://www.casaarabe-islam.es>).
5 For a detailed synthesis of  the position of  Sharia in today’s Muslim states, see abiad, N.: 
Sharia, Muslim States and international human rights treaty obligations: a comparative study, British 
Institute of  International and Comparative Law, London, 2008, pp. 34-58.
6 Cited by stReusand, D.: “What does Jihad mean?”,  Middle East Quarterly, September 1997. 
<http://www.meforum.org/article/357>; and by shah, Niaz A.: Self-defense in Islamic and 
International Law (Assessing Al-Qaeda and the invasion of  Iraq), Palgrave McMillan, New York, 
2008, p. 24.
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defensive armed fighting; conditional offensive fighting; and, finally, the offen-
sive fight against the infidels to spread Islam7. The doctrine is, of  course, used 
to incite and justify the political and military expansion of  Islam and is based 
on passages of  the Quran, the Sunnah and the Sira8.
Islamic law, which takes shape through reasoning, using the Holy Book 
and the Prophet’s Sunna, sets out in detail exactly what the obligation of  jihad 
against the infidel consists of, how often and how it should be carried out.
Ultimately, jihad, in its classical conception, consisted of  one of  the joint 
or collective duties (fard kifaya), that is to say, those whose performance by some 
exempted others from doing them, in contrast to personal or individual duties (fard 
ayn) which fall to each individual personally9. During its evolution, later on 
jihad was classified as an individual duty required of  all male Muslims and this 
is the belief  of  contemporary radical Islamists.
It is true, therefore, that in Muslim law the term jihad developed and acqui-
7 bouRlaRd, J.: Le jihâd. Les textes fondateirs de l’Islam face à la modernité, Studia Arabica VI, Édi-
tions de Paris, Versailles, 2008, p. 81.
8 There is also the Sira, a chronological presentation of  tales which record the life of  the 
Prophet, drawn up one century after his death, reflects the clear evolution of  jihad up to 
the 9th century, when the Sira was written, in its most warlike expression. Jean floRi states 
categorically that it is the Sira, more than the Quran itself  or the Sunnah, that describes more 
clearly an evolution of  the Prophet and the umma from the peaceful Mecca period and the 
self-defence of  Medina, moving on to ever more warlike positions when those fleeing Mecca 
re-conquered it later on (Guerra santa, yihad, cruzada. Violencia y religión en el cristianismo y en el 
Islam, translation into Spanish, Universities of  Granada and Valencia, Granada, 2004, pp. 99-
102). On the Sira, see saRdaR, Z. and davies, M.W.: Inshallah. Comprender el Islam, Fundación 
Intermón-Oxfam, Barcelona, 2005, pp. 23 ss.
9 In Risala fî-l-Fiqh by Abu ibn Zayd, already cited, chapter XXX (“the holy war”) says, “The 
holy war (jihad) is an obligation under Divine Law which is waged by some people for all 
others (...) (edition by Riosalido, J.: Compendio de Derecho islámico… cit. [note 2], p. 105).  They 
were collective duties under classical Islamic Law: Concern oneself  with knowing, teaching and 
promoting religious law; keep the root of  evil far away from Muslims; perform the duties 
of  judge; give evidence in court; accept imamship (whether to run the state or take prayers); 
order the good (and prohibit the bad); carry out the most important trades (those essential 
for the life of  the group, such as farmer, tailor, weaver, builder and tradesman, etc); respond 
to greetings; give the last rites to the deceased; rescue captive Muslims from the hands of  the 
enemy.  Personal duties are prayer, fasting, the ritual offering of  money (...) (Maíllo salgado, 
F.: “La Guerra Santa según el Derecho malikí. Su preceptiva, su influencia en el Derecho 
de las comunidades cristianas del medioevo hispano”, at <http://www.vallenajerilla.com/
berceo/maillo/guerrasanta.hym>).
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red other meanings, with the most significant being the so-called “major” ji-
had, or “great jihad”, as against the “minor” or “small jihad” (the effort on the 
path of  God and combat against the infidel). Although this spiritual, non-war-
like meaning of  the term appears (maybe “influencés par le monachisme chré-
tien”) 10 around the same time, or maybe at the end of  it, as the theory of  jihad 
was set as a doctrine, it was marginalised under classical Islamic law, so that 
the concept of  fighting on the path of  God to expand Islam amongst the 
“kaffirs” (non-believers) was, as already pointed out, its main meaning. For 
example, in two most famous compendia of  classical Islamic law written in 
Al-Andalus, the chapter on jihad only deals with the latter meaning11.
Finally, under the Islamic law which was shaped based on the Quran and 
the Sunnah from the 9th century onwards, jihad was basically understood to 
be the “Holy War” against non-Muslims. It was a collective obligation which, 
later on, was preached to all good male Muslims and was a permanent obli-
gation, remaining in force until the Islamic faith was imposed globally12.  It 
has been recently written that this Islamic law, the fiqh, as it was called, “est 
toujours enseigné aujourd´hui dans les universités islamiques” 13.
3. In summary, Islamic fundamentalism is based, therefore on the superiority 
of  the Islamic community and the Muslim religion. Islam’s aim is to spread 
over the world to save humanity from its unbelief, structuring society on new 
foundations for civilisation within the framework of  an Islamic state.  This 
train of  thought bases its message on certain passages in the Quran.
10 bouRlaRd, J.: Le jihad… cit. (note 7), p. 98.
11 The first is Risala fî-l-Fiqh by Abu ibn Zayd (one of  the most popular compendia of  clas-
sical Islamic law, written in the middle of  the 10th century by a faqih, an expert scholar of  
fiqh, of  the Maliki school, born in Spain. Abu Muhammad Abd Ibn Abi Zayd, was known as 
al-Qayrawani because he lived for most of  his life in the Tunisian village of  Qayrawan. Ibn 
Abi Zayd’s book (Risala fî-l-Fiqh) was very famous in its day, it was even said of  it, “that the 
Risala had miraculous powers and that it was even capable of  castigating those who made 
fun of  it” [prologue by the editor and translator, Riosalido, J.: Compendio de Derecho Islámico… 
cit. [note 2], p. 11]. The second of  the Manuals is Qidwat al-gâzi (The combatant’s guide) by Ibn 
Abî Mamman, the legible text of  which is conserved in manuscript 5349 at the National 
Library in Madrid (according to guillén Robles: Catálogo de los manuscritos árabes existentes en 
la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, 1989, pp. 234-235).
12 Along the same lines, bouRlaRd: Le jihâd… cit (note 7), p. 92.
13 Ibidem, p. 92.
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However, fundamentalists forget other passages with contradictory14 me-
anings, which means that, inevitably, doubt arises about which should prevail.
4. Ultimately, fundamentalist interpretations are based on the theory of  abro-
gation. According to the abrogation theory (or naskh), the ayahs revealed in 
an era which was chronologically later on would abrogate the previous ones15.
14 Because in the Holy Book, the ayahs relating to the attitude to be taken by Islam to the 
unbelievers can, according the floRi, be divided into various groups (Guerra santa… cit. [note 
8], pp. 88-96).
There are eight peaceful ayahs. Four were revealed in Mecca, before the hegira, when Mus-
lims were a minority amongst idolaters and polytheists.  These verses advise the faithful to 
be prudent and proclaim their faith with patience and wisdom.  The other four, which were 
proclaimed in Medina when the Prophet had allied himself  with Jewish tribes who he expec-
ted to convert, appeal for tolerance and pardon of  the infidels as God himself, at the final 
judgment, would castigate them for their unbelief  (chapter 2, ayahs 115-137; chapter 5, ayah 
10; chapter 29, ayahs 46-55 and chapter 42, ayah 16).
The ayahs against the reluctance to go to war, and destined to overcome the objections of  some 
believers to the orders to fight given by the Prophet, or extinguish the scruples which arose 
in respect to some pre-Islamic traditions, along with some which, although they are more 
generic by nature, are anti-pacifist (chapter 2, ayahs 190-191, 194, 218; chapter 3, ayahs 165-
169; chapter 4, ayahs 66-97; chapter 9, ayah 36; and chapter 33, ayahs 13-25). 
The warlike ayahs.  The most well-known of  which come from chapter 2.  There are some 
which establish beyond doubt the legality of  defensive jihad:
“Fight in the cause of  God those who fight you but do not commit aggression.  God does 
not love aggressors” (chapter 2, ayahs 186-190; also, chapter 2, ayahs 187-191 and 188-192).
Other verses order fighting the impious until the cult of  the one God is established in all 
parts. In all parts? It is probable that the Prophet was not thinking about any other territory 
than Arabia, as, in all certainty, he was alluding to the pre-Islamic idolaters or polytheists 
(floRi: Guerra santa… cit. [note 8], p. 93). Therefore:
“Fight them until there is no oppression and worship becomes devoted to God alone.  If  
they cease, then let there be no more hostility except against the oppressors” (chapter 2, ayah 
193).
Furthermore, other verses can be read in the Holy Book which clearly encourage combat 
on a permanent basis, not for defence, but to expand Islam, the true faith, as Muslims belie-
ve, which will save the world (chapter 2, ayahs 215-218; chapter 9, ayah 29; and chapter 47, 
ayahs 4 and 5), for example:
“Fight those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day, who do not prohibit what God 
and his Messenger prohibit, those do not practise the true religion amongst those who were 
given the Book! Fight them until they pay the capitation with their own hands and they are 
humiliated”.
15 Vid. “nasj” in the Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo, de góMeZ gaRCía, L., Espasa-Calpe, Ma-
drid, 2009, p. 246.
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Therefore, in as far as the belligerent, or warlike, verses are, because of  
the time they were revealed, all in an era after the peaceful or tolerant ones, 
the former would annul the latter. This theory rests on the understanding that 
the Prophet received his revelations depending on the historic needs of  his 
mission. At the beginning, taking the isolation of  the new faith into account, 
God advised him to avoid fighting (the peaceful ayahs). Later on, when the 
community settled in Medina, the revelation incited the believers to defend 
themselves from attacks by anyone harassing them with arms, or by those 
intending to forcibly reconvert the people who had embraced Islam. Finally, 
when the whole of  Arabia was Islamised, the Prophet announced the holy war 
against non-Muslims who did not convert to the call of  God16.
Its critics within the Islamic world, or scholars of  it, consider it to be 
based on an ambiguous interpretation of  some verses, in which it is not always 
pinpointed which verse abrogates which other and that, at any event, forgets 
that when the Quran wishes to abrogate a rule it always states this clearly, 
which is not what happens in this case, as, “there is no indication in the Quran 
with respect to the abrogation or revelation of  a different rule on legitimate 
defence”17.
5. That is to say, contemporary radical Islamism defends the concept of  jihad 
as a “holy war”. It classifies it as the duty of  all Muslims and perceives that 
any attack (including terrorism) against Christians and Jews, or their interests, 
(in other words, western civilisation) is legitimate in any part of  the world, and 
even against the governments of  certain Muslim countries who have become 
takfir, that is to say, consider themselves to be apostate.
16 On the theory of  abrogation, or naskh (which means “copy a book” and is applied to 
the Quran in the sense of  “remove” or “annul”) see the version of  one of  its defenders, 
an-na’iM, A.: “Islamic ambivalence to political violence: Islamic Law and international ter-
rorism”, German Yearbook of  International Law, 31 (1988), pp. 307-336 (pp.324 ss.), but also its 
critics: floRi, J.: Guerra santa… cit. (note 8), pp 87-88; shah, Niaz A.: Self-defense in Islamic and 
International Law (Assessing Al-Qaeda and the invasion of  Iraq), Palgrave McMillan, New York, 
2008, pp. 35-42.
17 The author of  the sentence refers to the one which only permits Islam to use force to 
defend itself  (shah, N.A.: The self-defense… cit., p. 39). Vid. Also asad, M.: The message of  the 
Quran, Dar Al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1997, p. 41; Wali, Ullah S.: Al-Fozul Al-Kabir, translation 
into English, Al-Faisal Nashran, Lahore (Pakistan), 2005, pp. 39-50.
Jihadist Islam and ist Rationale 
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 21-46
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.02
28
II. NEITHER MUSLIM “REFORMISM” OR THE SO-CALLED “NEO-REFORMISM” 
HAVE MANAGED TO ERADICATE THIS CONCEPT.
6. Jihad as a “holy war” for defence against the infidel, but also as a means of  
propagating the Muslim religion, formed, therefore, part of  the most ortho-
dox Islamic faith from, at least, the 8th and 9th centuries.
“Islamic Reformism” in the first half  of  the 19th century and the begin-
ning of  the 20th saw the dominant concept of  jihad (the “holy war” not just 
as a defence but also as an offensive, to propagate the true faith) to be the 
result of  a misunderstanding of  it and the fruit of  a misguided interpretation 
of  the Quran’s texts, in particular certain verses in the Quran, by the ancient 
commentators who, otherwise, were only being true to the prevailing intellec-
tual and cultural climate in bygone eras, which were very different to the years 
in which reformism preached its doctrine. More specifically, the reformists 
dissented on the interpretation given to the chapter on Repentance (chapter 
9 of  the Quran), and, in particular, verse 123: “Oh, you who believe! Fight 
those of  the disbelievers who attack you. Let them find severity in you and 
know that God is with the righteous”.
From the 5th century of  the Hegira (10th century AD), some commen-
tators on the Quran defended the theory that verse 123 of  chapter 9 esta-
blished the duty on Muslims to fight against the infidels wherever they were 
to be found. Their interpretation was based on the fact that the chapter on 
Repentance was revealed to the Prophet in Medina, that is to say, after the re-
velation received in Mecca, for which reason it annulled all the previous ones 
that contradicted it (the abrogation theory, or naskh). The Tunisian, Abdelaziz 
al-Thaalibi (1874-1944), one of  the Islamic reformists, recognised that chap-
ter 9 was revealed in Medina, but insisted on the need to take the historical 
context in which it occurred into account. He referred to a situation where 
Muslims defended themselves from the infidels, that is to say, it reflected a 
temporary situation after which the believers should, within the framework 
of  the Mecca revelations, go back to the previous state of  peace and recon-
ciliation18.
18 Analysis by the Palestinian professor al-ChaRif of  the thinker’s doctrine, includes a state-
ment by the latter which is truly strange.  The Tunisian al-Thaalibi called on his brothers to 
make “an interpretation of  the Quran which coincided with the principles of  the French 
Revolution which are shared by the holy book” (“Evolución del concepto de yihad…” cit. 
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The attempts at secular, liberal reform, stimulated by the new political 
and social structure in many Islamic countries, with a tolerant stance towards 
“the others” and an assertion of  the strictly defensive nature of  jihad, could 
not completely prevent the radical revisionism gestating in some of  those 
countries driven by a process incubated after the First World War (1914-
1918) and originating from the combination of  various factors19. In some of  
them, a trend towards acute religious fundamentalism arose, with political 
Islamic activists appearing who, above all in the last decades of  the 20th cen-
tury, went back to the practice of  armed violence against their external and 
internal enemies, based on the jihad of  classical Islamic law.
These fundamentalist theses are contested by other Islamic authors or 
scholars, who understand that the interpretation they read into the Holy Book 
- being the authorisation to use force offensively to propagate Islam - is con-
trary to a contextual interpretation of  it, contrary to the rules within it which 
provide for a non-coercive propagation of  Islam and, ultimately, contrary to 
the Quranic code regulating armed fighting based on the so-called neutrality 
principle. That is to say, that Islam should only fight against those fighting 
against it. According to this train of  thought, the Quran only legitimises the 
use of  force for what, today, we call legitimate defence, or to save the lives of  
persecuted Muslims. We will leave the latter subject for later on and, for the 
moment, concentrate on strictly defensive jihad.
In this respect, Al-Zuhili states that jihad is only lawful when it is needed 
to repulse an aggression, but conversion to Islam is not a reason to justify it 
or its purpose. The professor of  Islamic Law (fiqh) at the University of  Da-
mascus also states: “According to the majority of  Muslim legal scholars, the reason 
for going to war is to respond to an attack or aggression”20.
According to Niaz A. shah, supported by other authors21, the Holy Book 
[note 4], p. 21). 
19 Increase in the colonial offensive in the Western World, disintegration of  the Ottoman 
Empire and abolition of  the Caliphate, increase in the influence of  secular educational in-
stitutions, with the subsequent fight with groups vigorously defending the strict application 
of  Sharia (...).
20 al-Zuhili, Sheikh Wahbeh: “Islam and International law”, International Review of  the Red 
Cross (“Humanitarian debate: Law, policy, action. Religion”), 87, number 858, June 2005, pp. 
269-293 (pp. 279, 280).
21 Such as ali, Y.: The meaning of  the holy Qur’ an, Amana Corporation, Maryland, 1989 (pp. 
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only allows Muslims to use armed force to defend themselves when attacked, 
but not to commit aggression: “Permission is given to those who are fought 
against to go to war” (chapter 22, verse 39).
Legitimate defence must cease once the attack has been stopped: “Fight 
them until there is no oppression and worship becomes devoted to God 
alone. If  they cease, then let there be no more hostility except against the 
oppressors” (chapter 2, ayah 193).
shah maintains that the Quran also allows legitimate collective defence: 
“And why would you not fight in the cause of  God and the helpless men, wo-
men and children who cry out, ‘Our Lord, deliver us from this town whose 
people are oppressive!’ ” (chapter 4, ayah 75).
He also believes that the Quran itself  establishes the requirements for 
legitimate collective defence to be possible - it must be serious, significant 
persecution.
Ultimately, naiZ A. Shah maintains that the Quran allows self-defence in 
the face of  imminent attack (“If  you fear treachery on the part of  a people, 
break off  with them in a like manner. God does not like the treacherous” 
[chapter 8, ayah 58]). He cites the battle of  Badr22, led by Mohammed as the 
first example of  legitimate anticipatory defence23.
7. However, it is, in particular, the incursion of  the new reformists into Isla-
mic thinking that offers a glimmer of  hope on this subject.  Following this 
school of  thought, armed violence has shown itself  to be a failure.  Armed 
force is only legitimate in the case of  self-defence against foreign aggression. 
Neo-reformism maintains that Islam rejects offensive armed fighting (even 
78, 423, 832); daRyabadi, A.M.. The glorious Quran: Text, translations & commentary, The 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 2002 (pp. 68, 603); MohaMMad, N.. “The doctrine of  Jihad: 
An Introduction”, Journal of  Law and Religion, 3 (1985), pp. 391-398; asad, M.: The message of  
the Quran: cit. (note 17), p. 512.
22 shah, Niaz.A.: Self-defense in Islamic... cit. (note 16), pp. 15-17, 21.
23 In this battle, 300 Muslims commanded by Mohammed defeated 1,000 Quraysh who had 
gone to help the caravan that the Prophet intercepted and also to attack Medina. The Mes-
senger promised his followers victory and Paradise for those dying in combat and gave them, 
according to a revelation from God, a fifth of  the spoils. This fifth was divided into three 
parts, one for the Prophet, another for his family and the third for the poor, orphans and 
travellers (Quran, chapter 8, ayah 41).
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in the case of  apostasy) and self-sacrifice (suicide terrorism)24, as Islam’s rela-
tions with other communities should be founded on peace, with war being an 
accidental, temporary, exceptional event.
Neo-reformism emphasises the need for freedom from the fetters of  the 
medieval ideas written during the first years of  the Abbasid dynasty, when 
Islam dominated half  the world, which was divided by the House or Land of  
Islam (Dar al-islam) and the House or Land of  the Infidels (Dar al-harb).
Ultimately, the neo-reformists state that Muslims need a true religious re-
form, to reconsider their legal legacy, to establish new foundations of  Islamic 
law and legislation and construct a modern theory of  State and society which 
ensures the authority of  the community over itself.
Perhaps it is appropriate to go into these ideas in more depth at this point.
Those I have called the new reformists, to distinguish them from those 
who, in the 19th century and early 20th century, instigated a reform of  Islam, 
are a generation of  men, and some women, in several Muslim countries who 
believe that Islam as a whole needs to be “rethought”. A scholar of  Religion, 
with a capital R, has called them “the new Islamic thinkers”25, but in as far 
as they advocate a new legal interpretation of  their sacred texts and the fiqh 
(classical Islamic Law), the democratisation of  their societies and full free-
dom of  thought for all individuals, they are better classified as reformers or 
reformists. There are those who even know them as “the Islamic Lutherans”.
The Muslim past is not, for them, a type of  sacred and untouchable his-
tory but, instead, more simply, a part of  the history of  the human race based 
on a diversity of  social, economic, political and legal factors which evolve. 
The interpretation of  what Islam is, including its religious texts, should be 
done taking into account the state that such factors had reached in each era. 
When studying Islam and studying and interpreting its fundamental texts, 
they call on, and use, modern sciences, from linguistics and semiotics to the 
comparative histories of  religions or sociology.
24 Vid. ad ex. aktan, Hamza: “Acciones terroristas y ataques suicidas a la luz del Corán y la 
Sunna”, Ergün Çapan (editor): Una perspectiva islámica. Terrorismo y ataques suicidas, translated 
by Ali Larakí, Ediciones La Fuente, Somerset (New Jersey, USA), 2008, pp. 25-42; Çapan, 
Ergün: “Los ataques suicidas y el Islam”, Ergün Çapan (editor): Una perspectiva islámica. Ter-
rorismo y ataques suicidas, translated by Ali Larakí, Ediciones La Fuente, Somerset (New Jersey, 
USA), 2008, pp. 97-113. 
25 benZine, R.: Les nouveaux penseurs de l’Islam, Éditions Albin Michel, París, 2008, 2nd edition). 
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Therefore, the neo-reformists demand an in-depth review of  the foun-
ding texts of  Islam, which rests on two closely related demands: abandon 
the taqlid, the imitation, or uncritical, acceptance of  already established doc-
trines, the traditional position of  the Sunni scholars, and throw the doors 
open to ijtihad, a rational interpretation system, based on qiyas, or analogical 
reasoning26. Qiyas, used for the first time when the conquered countries had 
to integrate local laws and customs into the Quran and the Sunnah, was con-
sidered dangerous once Islam was consolidated. Its use was restricted, but 
resurfaced at the hand of  the religious reformism at the end of  the 19th 
century and the so-called neo-reformists. For example, in direct relation to 
the matter in hand, the jihad, the Sudanese, Mahmud Taha (1909-1985) pro-
posed inversion of  the traditional doctrine of  abrogation, or naskh, in such a 
way that the abrogating verses, according to that doctrine (the Medina, warli-
ke revelations), would become those abrogated, with the others (the pacifist 
Mecca revelations) becoming the abrogates. In this way, the Islamic message 
of  peace and conversion by example, dialogue and conviction (from Mecca) 
would have universal, eternal coverage, while the Medina message would be 
temporary and relative and only valid for the historical era it was dictated in27.
So who are these brave men and women confronting a secular tradition? 
There are not just a handful of  them and they are not all from the same coun-
try - they come from South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, the USA, India, Iran, Ma-
laysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan and Tunisia28. Not all of  them think 
alike or, on religious, political or social matters, reach exactly the same con-
clusions. However, all of  them have the conviction in common that reflection 
on, and interpretation of, the Quran and the Sunnah and, in general, Islamic 
traditions, must be done from the point of  view of  the demands of  reason 
and modern science, in its various forms.
The appearance of  the neo-reformist movement is, without doubt, a win-
dow of  hope, which contrasts with radical Islamism in many sectors of  the 
26 On these Arabic terms, see góMeZ gaRCía, L.: Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo cit. (note 15), 
pp. 326-327 (taqlid), 148-150 (ichtihad) y 271 (qiyás).
27 Vid. oeveRMann, A.: “Tahâ, Mahmûd Muhammad”, Encycplopédie de l’Islam, vol. X (2002), 
pp. 104-105 (second edition, Brill, Leyden, 12 volumes, 1960-2005).
28 About some of  them and their ideas (Esack, Arkoun, Abû Zayd, al-Khüli, Khalafallâh, 
Rahman and Charfi), vid. Rachid benZine: Les nouveux penseurs… cit. (note 25), pp. 59 ss., 89 
ss., 121 ss., 149 ss., 181 ss., 215 ss., 247 ss.
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umma. However, the hope of  a reformed Islam from a religious, political, legal 
and cultural point of  view is very faint because the calls of  the new reformers 
do not seem to have a great chance of  success. This is because their proposers 
are outside the educational and communications organisations in the Arab 
countries and are, in many cases, suffering the animosity of  political powers 
and religious authorities who are, by nature, conservative. They are also, of  
course, facing hostility from the Islamic militants who do not appreciate their 
liberalism or their claim that the concept of  the Islamic state is the result of  
an interpretation that distorts the fundamental Islamic texts. Ultimately, they 
will not, and do not, have a broad social base within the believers as a whole.
Islamic fundamentalism is not just represented by jihadist terrorism. The-
re is ethical and religious fundamentalism, tinted with pragmatism in its rela-
tionship with the West, it can be said, but which constitutes the fuel for the 
profound Islam that calls the faithful to prayer and, as a great expert on the 
subject has written, manages “a medieval-style, anachronistic world view”29. 
It is this fundamentalism, far removed from the subject according to which 
the Shiites (10% of  Islam) are the extremists par excellence while the Sunni 
(85%) are the moderates, which is inspired by ayah 110 in chapter 3 of  their 
Holy Book: “You are the best community that ever emerged for humanity: 
you advocate what is moral, and forbid what is immoral, and believe in God”.
III. IT IS STILL HERE, AMONGST US TODAY.
1. FROM AL QAEDA
8. Radical Islamic thought, which is defended today by thinkers such as the 
Egyptian, Qutb, the Pakistani, Al-Maududi, or the Palestinian, Abdullah Yu-
suf  Azzam30, springs from a doctrinal construction based on an interpreta-
tion of  the holy texts of  Islam given in the 9th and 11th centuries. However, 
their ideas have not remained at the level of  pure intellectual debate. Islamic 
terrorist organisations, such as Al-Qaeda, have justified their armed, acts of  
violence and terrorism by invoking the jihad doctrine. The question is whe-
29 paRadela alonso, N.: “Belicismo y espiritualidad: una caracterización del yihad islámico”, 
ed. digital “arabismo.com”, 2002, pp. 1-22, p. 20.
30 About his ideas, see my analysis “Radicales y reformistas en el Islam (sobre el uso de la 
violencia)”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, LXI (2009), number 1, pp. 13-37.
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ther they do so on the basis of  duty of  all Muslims to propagate the faith, as 
commented on, or whether they have other reasons.
9. The so-called Ladenese Epistle is a message from Osama bin Laden, head 
of  Al-Qaeda, addressed, in general, to all Muslims worldwide and, in particu-
lar, to those on the Arabian Peninsula demanding the expulsion of  the here-
tics from it and an armed fight against them, everywhere and by all means, as 
a way of  putting pressure on them to leave the Holy Places.
Signed on Friday, 23 August 1996, the text sets out the attacks suffered by 
Muslims in various parts of  the world (for example, in Bosnia), the presence 
of  the American Crusaders in lands he calls Islamic Gulf  (better known as the 
Persian Gulf), who threaten oil reserves and, in particular, American troops 
being stationed in Saudi Arabia which, in the opinion of  the Epistle’s author, 
reveals that its rulers have turned their back on Islam. The Epistle calls for 
jihad against the American-Israeli alliance and against the Saudi regime itself, 
until the infidels are expelled from the Holy Places and Muslims see that their 
rights are respected31. In this fight, the Epistle endorses any means of  armed 
combat, including terrorist attacks and attacks on innocent people.32
Although on occasions the language of  the Epistle is ambiguous, and, 
on others, cryptic, it seems that it claims jihad as a defence against the ag-
gressions that Islam was suffering for the reasons noted. It sits, therefore, 
31 “We wish to study the means that we could follow to return the situation to its normal 
path. And to return to the people their own rights, particularly after the large damages and 
the great aggression on the life and religion of  the people (...)”. Further on, it continues, 
“Today your brothers and sons, the sons of  the Two Holy Places, have started their jihad in 
the cause of  Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from the country of  the Two Holy Places. 
And there is no doubt that you would like to carry out this mission too, in order to re-es-
tablish the greatness of  this Ummar and liberate its occupied sanctuaries.” (Ladenese Epistle: 
Declaration of  War: “Expel the infidels from the Arab Peninsula’”, <http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A4342-2001Sep21.html<). 
32 “Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of  power between 
our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of  fighting must be adopted, ie, 
using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate 
a guerrilla warfare where the sons of  the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it. 
And as you know, it is wise, in the present circumstances, for the armed military forces not 
to be engaged in a conventional fighting with the forces of  the Crusader enemy (...) unless a 
big advantage is likely to be achieved; and great losses induced on the enemy side (that would 
shaken and destroy its foundations and infrastructures) that will help to expel the defeated 
enemy from the country.” (Ladenese Epistle…, p. 15).
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on a defensive approach to jihad as it does not appear to justify itself  with 
the intention of  propagating of  Islam. As one Islamic author recently wrote, 
“The Manifesto does not state that Al-Qaeda wants to Islamise the West or 
convert the United States, the United Kingdom or other western countries 
into Islamic States.”33
A very different matter is that, when the Epistle was written (1996), none 
of  the Arabian countries were being subjected to armed attack by the West. 
The accusations thrown at the Saudi Arabian regime also appear to be un-
founded. At any event, the jihad on which Al-Qaeda sought to ground its 
actions clearly exceeds the limits imposed by Islamic law itself  on the use of  
force in legitimate defence, quite apart, from the perspective of  Islamic law, 
from probably lacking the powers to do so.
10. On 23 February 1998, the radical World Islamic Front, made up of  
Al-Qaeda and other organisations in Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh, publi-
shed a new statement, or Manifesto (“Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders”) 
with the same ideas as the Ladenese Epistle and the same arguments. The 
only difference, otherwise, between the Manifesto and the Epistle, which is 
politically significant, is that the former confirms that bin Laden’s message 
had reached other radical Islamic organisations34.
The Manifesto’s authors issued a fatwa to all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is 
an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which 
it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy 
mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out 
of  all the lands of  Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This 
is in accordance with the words of  Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans 
all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no 
more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.35
Later events, such as the Israeli attack on Hamas in Gaza, in December 
200836, prompted the leaders of  Al-Qaeda, in the case of  Osama bin Laden 
33 shah, Niaz A.: Self  defense-in Islamic... cit. (note 16), p. 50.
34 Ibidem, pp. 52-53.
35 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4993-2001Sep21.html>; also at 
<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.
36 On the Israeli army’s “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza vid. noRton, A.R.: “The Gaza War: 
Jihadist Islam and ist Rationale 
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 21-46
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.02
36
and Aymal Al-Zawahiri, and the director of  the terrorist organisation for the 
Islamic Magreb, Abu Musab Abdelwadoud, to release various messages and 
communiqués. These came from first two on 14 (recording) and 6 and 21 
January and from the latter on 2 and 15 of  the same month. They are also 
useful to clarify what kind of  jihad these modern Islamists advocate and, 
what is more important, practice today. Their proclamations state,
“I say to my Islamic nation: being merely satisfied to consider the governors 
and clerics to be responsible, but then abstaining from acting does not ab-
solve you from responsibility.  This is another way of  evading our duty. In 
the sacred Quran, Allah’s mandate is clear: participation in the jihad for the 
cause, by possessions or yourselves must continue until it becomes a collec-
tive duty” (Osama bin Laden, recording of  14 January 2009).
“¡Oh Muslims wherever you are, fight against the Zionist-Christian cam-
paign and strike their interests wherever you may find them.” (al-Zawahiri, 
message of  6 January 2009).
“Lions of  Islam everywhere [you must] strike the interests of  Islam’s ene-
mies, that is to say the Christians and the Jews, wherever you can and howe-
ver you can.” (Osama bin Laden, recording of  14 January).
“Hold out your hands to your Mujahedeen brothers and slam the Jewish 
and Christian interests in your countries shut. Without compassion or indul-
gence.  Whip the targets with precision.  Give information to your brothers.  
Make plans securely.  Resort to secrecy and silence.” (Call to “our people in 
the Magreb” by Abu Musab Abdelwadoud on 15 January 2009). 
The rulers of  Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and 
Iraq, with Abu Musab adding those of  Algeria and Mauritania, were also 
classified as traitors and renegades, and the jihad should also be unleashed 
on them.  They were accused of  forming “a satanic alliance consisting of  
antecedents and consequences”, ARI number 21/2009, 03/02/2009, pp. 1-9 <http://www.
realinstitutoelcano.org>; aMado CastRo, V.M.: “Israel y la Guerra de Gaza”, ARI number 
16/2009, 22/01/2009, pp. 1-6; kaRMon, E.: “Hamás en Gaza, una plataforma de Irán 
para la desestabilización del mundo árabe”, Athena Assessment number 1/2009, 2 January 
2009, pp. 1-12 <http://www.athenaintelligence.org>; fighel, J.: “Hamas, Al-Qaeda and 
the Islamisation of  the Palestinian cause”, ARI number 19/2009, 30/01/2009, pp. 1-10; 
alváReZ-ossoRio alvaRiño, I.: “Gaza: el paisaje después de la batalla”, ARI number 
13/2009, 20/01/2009, pp. 1-7. Vid. also the analysis by F. ReinaRes “¿Qué dicen los líderes 
de al-Qaeda sobre la operación militar israelí en Gaza?”, ARI number 14/2009, 21 January, 
pp. 1-6 <http://realinstitutoelcano.org>.
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Jews, Christians and renegades” (message on 15 January from the director of  
Al-Qaeda en the Magreb).
2. TO THE ISLAMIC STATE (ALSO KNOWN AS DA’ESH)
11. Without doubt, the most significant and far reaching feature of  the 
self-proclaimed Islamic State are its intended targets.  The Caliphate does not 
(like Al-Qaeda) simply want to expel the infidels from current “Muslim soil”. 
Da’esh, in 2017, wanted to expand Islam and its concept of  Islam with the 
aim of  creating a universal Caliphate.
That is to say, in 2017, the Islamic State defended what the erudite, reli-
gious Muslim Ibn Jaldún wrote in the 14th century and which a German his-
torian reminded us of  in 2006: “In Islam, jihad is prescribed by Law, because 
it [Islam] has a universal mission which concerns all humanity, which freely, 
or by force, must convert to Islam.”37
12. Salafist extremism (see paragraph 24 below) definitely seeks to establish 
the universal Caliphate, ie, humankind as a community, exclusively governed 
under Islamic law and the protection of  Allah.  This is not mere rhetoric, 
but a recurring pretence in the propaganda distributed by Da’esh strategists. 
According to its believers, it is a fight demanded by divine mandate, and they 
cite one of  the sayings (hadiths) of  the Prophet:
I have received the order to combat the people until they confess that there 
is no other divinity than Allah.  Whoever confesses this has nothing to fear 
from me, their person or property may not be attacked unless it is in a way 
that accords with Islamic Law and it is God who will be responsible for 
them.38
It should be remembered that jihad (the holy war) is, for this radical 
approach, one of  the pillars of  Islam and, furthermore, the second most 
important one after the profession of  faith39.  The radicals’ world is divided 
into two:
37 flaig, E.: “Der Islam Hill die Welteroberung” <http://www.faz.net/Rub475F682/E3F-
C26868A8A5276D4FB91607/Doc%7EE2671621C119, FAZ, 15.09.2006>; and its trans-
lation into English: “Islam wants to conquer the World” <http://www.westernresistance.
com/blog/archives/003067.html>.
38 Paragraph 102 of  the chapter on jihad in the al-Bujari collection (supra note 2)
39 Vid. supra note 3.
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• The House of  Peace (Dar al-Islam) that lives in accordance with Sharia 
- Islamic law, and
• The House of  War (Dar al-Harb), which is the rest of  the world with 
which is at permanent, latent war that is reactivated ever so often and 
which will only end once Dar al-Islam occupies the entire world.
Although this division of  the world is not expressly mentioned in the Qu-
ran (but it does include the distinction between the territory of  the believer 
and that of  who is not), it was established by later scholars. 40
This is a fight against non-Muslims, and even against Muslims who do 
not follow the dictates of  Allah.  For jihadists, who today seek a universal 
Caliphate, the most pressing thing is to conquer (or re-conquer, as they un-
derstand it, in certain cases) the following regions of  the world for Islam:
•  The Iberian Peninsula, as part of  the concept of  Al-Andalus which 
reaches as far as the south of  France.
•  The Magreb, understood to be the north east and west of  Africa, the 
Sahel, or Sahara region, from coast to coast, and central and eastern 
Africa, with all the countries included in these areas.
•  The Middle East, ie, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Leba-
non, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Turkey.
•  Vienna, Greece, the Balkans, southern Russian and Central Asia are 
also included41.
13. We are all threatened. All of  us.  By a terrorist organisation which, mo-
reover, does not have any red lines it must not cross in achieving its aims. 
Anything goes. From alliances with other groups (terrorists, subversives and 
criminal organisations) and using computer hackers, or mercenaries, to using 
commercial airlines full of  passengers as bombs, driving HGVs to run over 
crowds of  people (Nice and Berlin 2015) or 4x4s to do likewise, into the 
40 Cook, D.: Understanding Jihad, University of  California Press, Los Angeles, 2005, p. 8 (and 
in more detail in pp. 30-44). Mohammed considered that the work of  Jesus (Jesus Christ) was 
incomplete as he did not manage historically to found a community that was strong enough 
to impose, if  necessary, the will of  God, because humankind is divided into those who are 
subservient to Allah (dar-al-Islam) and the infidels (dar al-harb), with Allah having the right 
to subservience from the world (MaRtíneZ fResneda, F.: La paz. Actitudes y creencias, publi-
caciones del Instituto Teológico Franciscano, Editorial Espigas, Murcia, 2002, pp. 213-214).
41 MaRtín de poZuelo, E.; boRdas, J.; yitZhak, E.: Objetivo: Califato universal. Claves para com-
prender el yihadismo, La Vanguardia Ediciones S.L., Barcelona, 2015, pp. 69-78.
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pedestrians on the footpaths of  a bridge (London, Wednesday 22 March 
2017), strafing people indiscriminately in a disco, and using chemical weapons 
against civilians.
The excesses of  the Islamic State, extreme radicalism which often appears 
in time of  crisis, which has lead it to be compared to the German Nazis42, ma-
nifest themselves in the most horrible way in this ferocious terrorism which 
stops at nothing. A terrorism, furthermore, which is a calculated strategy, 
seeking to ensure the submission of  the infidel to the will of  God. A clearly 
radical Pakistani general explains it as follows: “(…) Quranic military strategy 
demands that we prepare ourselves for war with the utmost effort, to strike 
fear into the heart of  the enemies (...).  In this strategy (...) filling enemy 
hearts with terror is the ‘Effect’”.43
14. Even the United Nations Security Council, having resisted facing up to 
the matter for so long, has ended up recognising that the Islamic State is, to-
day, the main worry for the international community. I will not go into details, 
but I would say that, in the words of  the Council in 2015: “the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), constitutes a global and 
unprecedented threat to international peace and security...” 44.
15. The United Nations Security Council has not just limited itself  to urge the 
organisation’s 193 member states to prevent and suppress the flow of  foreign 
terrorist fighters to Iraq and Syria (resolution 2178 [2014]), to prevent and 
suppress financing the Islamic State (resolution 2253 [2015]) or to “condem-
42 Calvo albeRo, J.: “Capítulo segundo: respuesta militar”, Cuadernos de Estrategia 180. Estrate-
gias para derrotar al Daesh y la reestabilización regional, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 
Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2016, pp. 63-96, p. 65.
43 Malik, S.K.: The Quranic concept of  war, Adam Publishers, Nueva Delhi, 1992, p. 58.
44 Resolution 2249 (2015), unanimously approved on 20 November 2015, paragraph 5 of  its 
preamble. As follows:
• its violent extremist ideology,
•  its terrorist acts, 
• its continued gross systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, 
• abuses of  human rights and violations of  international humanitarian law, including 
those driven on religious or ethnic ground, 
• its eradication of  cultural heritage and trafficking of  cultural property, but also its con-
trol over significant parts and natural resources across Iraq and Syria and its recruitment 
and training of  foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and Member 
States, even those far from conflict zones.
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ning” the abuses committed by Da’esh and to “reaffirming”,
“that those responsible for committing or otherwise responsible for terro-
rist acts, violations of  international humanitarian law or violations or abuses 
of  human rights must be held accountable”45.
It also “calls upon” all member States that have the capacity to do so to:
“take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in parti-
cular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, 
refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of  ISIL 
also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their 
efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL 
(...) and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant 
parts of  Iraq and Syria.” 46
The Security Council, therefore, seems to be telling us to use everything 
necessary and stop Da’esh for once and for all, defeat it and expel it from 
Iraq and Syria.
16. So that is what we are doing.  In Iraq, an International Coalition of  al-
most 70 States, including Spain and led by the USA, has, at the request of  
the Iraqi government, been carrying out military attacks on the Islamic State 
since 8 August 2014. From 23 September, the Coalition expanded its attacks 
on the Islamic State to Syria, although its government had not requested it. 
In September 2015, the Syrian regime asked Russian to initiate military inter-
vention in the country against the groups (including the Islamic State) who 
were against the Damascus Government. For 20 months (between 2013 and 
2015), the Islamic State took the lead in Iraq and Syria, “they decide what, 
when, how and where to attack. They are more concerned with the next at-
tack than in the defence of  their territories”.47
45 Resolution 2249 (2015), paragraphs 4 and 3.
46 Resolution 2249 (2015), paragraph 5. On this resolution and, in particular, its paragraph 5, 
vid. gutiéRReZ espada, C.: “’Choque de civilizaciones’ (el autoproclamado Estado Islámico). 
Respuesta de la comunidad internacional. ¿una ‘alianza de civilizaciones’ contra el Estado 
Islámico?”, Anuario de los cursos de Derechos Humanos de Donostia-San Sebastián. Vol. XVI (2016), 
Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra), 2017, pp. 111-213 (vid. paragraphs 42-46; also poZo 
seRRano, P.: “El uso de la fuerza contra el estado Islámico en Irak y Siria: problemas de 
fundamentación jurídica”, Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional, issue 32, 2016, pp. 141-188 
(pp. 183-186).
47 ballesteRos, M.A.: Yihadismo, La Huerta Grande, Colección de Ensayos, Madrid, 2016, p. 
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However, from the middle of  2015, Da’esh retreated and lost ground in 
both countries. Then the Iraqi and Syrian government forces took the lead. 
In March 2017, Mosul, the Iraqi city where Abu Bark Al-Bagdadi proclaimed 
himself  Caliph and Imam to the believers on 29 June 2014, was on the point 
of  being repossessed by the Iraqi army with the help of  the International 
Coalition. Racca, the capital of  the Islamic State in Syria was in a similar po-
sition.
For the Islamic State, the loss of  territories, apart from the symbolic and 
media impact on the military plan that their retreat implies, involves a signifi-
cant drain on its resources.  For example, we can look at the factor providing 
Da’esh with its greatest income.  According to a high-ranking Russian official, 
since 30 September 2015, the date of  the Russian intervention in Syria, the 
number of  fuel tankers belonging to the Islamic State has been drastically re-
duced, 32 oil refinery complexes, 11 refineries, 23 pumping stations and more 
than 1,000 fuel tankers have been destroyed. Since October 2014, around 
twenty of  the 160 oil fields under Da’esh’s control have been attacked by the 
International Coalition.  Their oil production has fallen from 100,000 barrels 
per day to 40,000. Furthermore, the need for fuel to feed their war and sus-
tain everyday life in the Caliphate has meant that the Islamic State has had 
to refine crude oil in a very rough manner, which makes it a very low quality, 
poorly performing product. This is an interesting fact because, as General 
Ballesteros states: “it undermines the moral of  the people and is a dissuading 
factor in recruiting followers.”48
The “territorial” retreat of  the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, with the 
actions of  the International Coalition supporting the Iraqi forces, and the 
attacks on it in Syria by the coalition and the Russian forces, after the military 
intervention in that country in (requested) support of  the Damascus Govern-
ment, demonstrates that its finances, as a whole, are significantly diminished. 
So much so that, since the start of  the Russian intervention in 2015, Da’esh 
began to pass a huge number of  documents relating to new security measu-
res, military mobilisation and obtaining new resources.
It is no exaggeration to stress the importance of  complete eradication of  
the Islamic State from the territory they control in Iraq and Syria, as its power 
155.
48 Ibidem, p. 140.
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comes, for the most part, from its foothold on the territory.
17. At any event, the Caliphate will be eradicated because the international 
community has adopted many and various responses, that is to say, it is facing 
up to the Islamic State in various fields or aspects.
It is doing so at political level, within the framework of  an action in the 
states by the antiterrorist security forces and bodies (including, of  course, a 
response to prevent and fight against radicalisation)49, in the field of  propa-
ganda, computers and cyber security and also, but not on its own, at military 
level with the use of  the armed forces50.
Only a global, comprehensive response of  this kind will enable achieve-
ment of  the defeat of  the self-proclaimed Islamic State. I fully share the idea 
that, “Military response, although it is necessary to wear down and halt the 
expansion of  Da’esh, is insufficient on its own and may end up creating even 
bigger problems.”51
In other words, as a general rule, the end of  all armed conflict does not 
come from the use of  military power, but this forms a part, also as a general 
rule, of  the solution.52
18. The response from the international community should, at any event, be 
in accordance with Law and, specifically, International Law.
I will not go into the matter here, but I can mention that the military 
response by the international community to the Islamic State, particularly in 
Syria, is not free from doubts when it comes to its strict legality. It is, rather, 
and in the best case scenario, walking on the proverbial knife edge.
49 On radicalisation, its factors and environment, particularly in Spain vid. ReinaRes, F. y 
gaRCía-Calvo, C.: Estado Islámico en España, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2016, pp. 1-81 
(pp. 35-46) <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org>.
50 There is an extremely interesting analysis of  the international community’s response on all 
these fronts by a Working Party at the Spanish Institute of  Strategic Studies, coordinated by 
Professor Javier Jordán Enamorado, with contributions from the military and professors, F.J. 
Berenguer Hernández (pp. 21-61), J.L. Calvo albeRo (pp. 63-95), M. navaRRete paniagua 
(pp. 97-123), and Manuel R. toRRes soRiano (pp. 167-194). Their contributions can be con-
sulted in the book Cuadernos de Estrategia 180. Estrategias para derrocar al Dáesh y la reestabilización 
regional, Ministry of  Defence, Madrid, 2016.
51 JoRdán enaMoRado, J.: “Introducción”, Cuadernos de estrategia 180. Estrategias… cit., pp. 
9-19 (p. 14).
52 Calvo albeRo, J.: op. cit. (note 42), p. 78.
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Do desperate times need desperate measures? Should these be in line with 
the nature of  the threat? You may draw your own conclusions.
19. It may be that the Islamic State is militarily defeated in Syria and Iraq, 
which appears to have been achieved (February 2018), as all the territory lost 
has been re-conquered by the Iraqi army, with help from the International 
Coalition, and, in Syria, it has been expelled from the areas it conquered. Its 
leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, proclaimed Caliph (Caliph Ibrahim) in June 
2014 in the Great Mosque in Mosul (Iraq) and who, on 16 June 2017, was 
believed (probably) to be dead, according to sources in the Russian forces 
in Syria, in a Russian bombing of  Racca (the capital of  the Caliphate in that 
country). However, he is not dead but is, according to a high-ranking official 
at the Iraqi Home Office (Abu Ali Al-Basri, Director General of  Intelligence 
and Counterterrorism, quoted on Monday 12 February 2018 by the govern-
ment daily paper As Sabah), “injured, has diabetes, and fractures to his body 
and legs which prevent him from walking without help” and, according to the 
same source, is in hiding, “in (the region of) al-Jazira” (a large desert plain in 
north east Syria and on the border with Iraq)53.
Nevertheless, defeat has not meant that the two elements sustaining and 
explaining the phenomenon of  this extreme manifestation of  radical Isla-
mism have vaporised:
• Jihadism itself, on the one hand, born of  the frustration of  one part of  
Muslim society, and
• On the other, the Sunni problem.  The Sunnis, previously dominant 
in Iraq and Syria, today consider themselves to be marginalised and 
alienated by the Shiites54.
Until these fundamental matters are resolved, they will continue to create 
instability and conflicts within the Muslim world and fuel terrorism against 
the Western World.
3. A NEW CALIPHATE IN SAHEL?
53 “The Iraq Government confirms that the leader of  the Islamic State is alive, but injured”, 
AFP, Baghdad (Iraq), Monday 12 February 2018 <https://www.elpais.com.uy/mundo>. 
The Iraq government official who made the news public stated that his government had 
based it on “unquestionable information and documents from the heart of  the terrorist 
organisation”.
54 Calvo albeRo, J.: op. cit. (note  42), p. 78.
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20. Three international missions are taking action in the Sahel region of  Mali, 
in West Africa. One is French (Operation Barkane), which fights alongside 
the Mali government in the struggle against the Tuareg and Jihadist rebellion 
in the north of  the country, which began in 2012.  Another is from the Uni-
ted Nations, and the third is the European Union Mission in Mali (EUTM 
Mali) which is made up of  580 soldiers from 27 EU member states.
21. Spain took command of  EUTM Mali at the beginning of  this year (2018), 
at its most critical moment, as five years have already passed since the abo-
ve-mentioned French and international missions arrived in the country and 
the conflict has significantly worsened. The Spanish Brigadier General, Enri-
que Millán Martínez, has been in charge of  the Mission since January 2018.
Military intelligence sources reveal that fighters from Syria and Iraq, coun-
tries in which the Islamic State has been defeated, are arriving at the conflict 
zone, as well as from Afghanistan (Taliban), ie, fighters with military training 
and experience of  war. General Millán Martínez, who now commands the 
EU Mission in Mali, has expressly stated that Da’esh, repelled in the Middle 
East, “is seeking a place to anchor.  They have one foot firmly placed in the 
dessert and want to reinforce on the banks of  the river Niger”55. Military 
experts explain that Da’esh intends to reconstruct the Caliphate in Sahel, as 
the heart of  Mali is a strategic passageway between the jihadist groups in the 
Sahara and Boko Haram, in northern Nigeria.
Furthermore, the various jihadist bands and groups within Al Qaeda are 
coordinating their activities and have even formed an organisation they call 
the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM).
22. It goes without saying that the collusion of  jihadist terrorist organisations 
such as Al Qaeda and Da’esh in the zone, with Libya being a failed state on 
the doorstep of  the European Union, could be very, very dangerous factors.
IV. WHAT NOW?
23. “We shall not be moved”.
55 gonZáleZ, M.: “España toma el mando de la misión europea para evitar que Mali sea el nue-
vo Califato”, El País, 31 January 2018, <https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/01/31/
actualidad/1517401742-402628.html>).
Cesáreo GUTIÉrreZ esPADA
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 21-46
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.02
45
24. Preventing the radicalisation of  Muslims living amongst us is vital.  Three 
articles recently published in France (kapel, G.: Terreur dans l’Haxagone. Genèse 
du djihad français, 2016), the USA (neuMann, P.: Radicalized: New jihadists and 
the Threat to the West, 2016) and in Belgium (sûReté de l’ état: Salafisme en 
Bélgique: mécanismes et réalité, 2018), alert us to the dangers of  Salafism and its 
spread amongst Muslims living in the West.
Salafism, “a doctrine propagated and financed by the mullahs of  the oil 
kingdoms in the Gulf ”56, preaches a complete break with the values of  de-
mocracy, human rights and gender equality. Its followers delegitimise the so-
cieties they live in, setting themselves up in closed communities, which vo-
luntarily and consciously exclude themselves from the society around them. 
This makes it extremely difficult for the second generation to take root in 
that society as they are shrouded by an environment of  exacerbated Islamism 
which drives them to a militant commitment to jihad.
All the resources and efforts we dedicate to preventing radicalisation are 
highly important, not to mention crucial.
25. Islam is a great civilisation. It has its dark side, like all civilisations do and 
have done throughout history, but it also has its bright side.
The West should cooperate. The West should talk to the true Islam. I 
believe that in the struggle to keep alive the hope that the appearance of  
neo-reformism entails, at this time, we must engage the Muslims themselves.
It is the Muslims themselves who, in the second half  of  the 19th cen-
tury and even in the second half  of  the 20th century, have shone a light on 
ideas for reform which proclaim peace, pardon and fruitful, sincere dialogue 
amongst civilisations. These civilisations must bring to light that this radi-
cal terrorism, which we call fundamentalism, in an attempt to legitimise its 
barbarism merely invokes hypothetical justifications, based on an irrational, 
anachronistic reading of  their holy texts. Put another way, the professor of  
Police and Criminal Investigation at the University of  Lancashire (UK), Syed 
Manzar Abbas Zaidi, in a lucid reflection on the problem, says that funda-
mentalism distorts the true message of  Islam57, or, as the Moroccan historian 
56 ReinaRes, F.: “Advertencias sobre el salafismo”, <https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/> 
(read on Wednesday 21 February 2018).
57 “The fundamentalist distortion of  the Islamic message”, Athena Intelligence Journal, vol. 3, 
number 4 (2008), pp. 59-75 (http://www.athenaintelligence.org). 
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Abdullah Laroui maintains:
“Relating violence with the ideology of  Islam (...) is dishonest on both si-
des, both from the Muslim side and the non-Muslim side.  I know enough 
about history to know that all political movements, at some time, fall into 
the trap of  resorting to violence. Throughout history there has been Puritan 
terrorism, Jacobean terrorism, anarchistic terrorism, Zionist terrorism, Hin-
du terrorism and Confucian terrorism. I could make a longer list and show 
that the men who made this into a thoroughly worked out theory, such as 
Bakunin or Georges Sorel, were not, at any time, thinking of  Islam.”58
There is another Islam and there are other Muslims. We should talk to 
them and agree with them. These are the Muslims who begin their most 
heartfelt prayers with the invocation: “In the name of  God, the Merciful, the 
Compassionate”.
Murcia, thursday 2018-04-19
58 “La modernización de Marruecos: la palabra y el objeto”, Text from Casa Árabe, <http://
www.casaarabe.es> (read on Monday 19 February 2018).
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